Stock Redemptions Under IRC Sections 302, 303, and 304 by Levin, Michael Ira
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 80, 
1975-1976 
3-1-1976 
Stock Redemptions Under IRC Sections 302, 303, and 304 
Michael Ira Levin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Michael I. Levin, Stock Redemptions Under IRC Sections 302, 303, and 304, 80 DICK. L. REV. 434 (1976). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol80/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Stock Redemptions Under IRC
Sections 302, 303, and 304
Michael Ira Levin*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ----------- - -- 435
A. General Considerations ------------------ 435
B. Historical Treatment ------------------------- 437
II. Redemptions Not Equivalent to Dividends ----------- 440
A. Background - -------------- 440
1. Flexible Net Effect Test ------------------- 441
2. Strict Net Effect Test --------------------- 444
B. United States v. Davis -------------------- 444
C. Criticism of the Davis Approach ------ - 448
III. Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions ----------- 452
IV. Termination of Shareholder's Interest --------------- 452
A. Statutory Scheme --------------- 452
1. Effect of Debt Instrument --------- 452
2. Attribution of Ownership Rules - ------- 453
B. Use of Buy-Sell Agreements to Reduce
a Corporation's Price ------------------------ 459
1. From the Seller's Viewpoint ---------------- 459
2. From the Buyer's Viewpoint ---------------- 460
V. Redemptions To Pay Death Taxes ---------------- 462
A. In General--------------------- 462
B. Statutory Scheme --------------------------- 463
1. Relationship of Stock to Decedent's Estate ------ 463
2. Time Limitation for Redemption ------------ 464
3. Persons Who May Use Section 303 ----------- 465
4. Stock with Substituted Basis ---------------- 465
VI. Redemptions Through Related Corporations --------- 466
A. Background ...... - ----------------------------------------------- 466
B. Statutory Framework ------------------------- 466
1. Brother-Sister Corporations ---------------- 466
2. Parent-Subsidiary Corporations -------------- 467
Stock Redemptions
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
3. Control -------------------------------- 467
4. Scope of Section 304 ---------------------- 468
C. Relationship to Other Code Sections -------------- 468
1. Section 351 ---------------- 468
2. Sections 317 and 306 ---...............--------------------- 470
VII. A Final Note ----------------------------------- 470
I. Introduction
A. General Considerations
Of special interest to attorneys counseling owners and managers
of closely held corporations are the redemption provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.' Without proper planning a stock redemp-
tion can have disastrous tax consequences. For example, if a corpo-
ration distributes $100,000 to its sole shareholder in redemption of
stock having a basis of the same amount, instead of realizing no gain
or loss as would be expected, the shareholder will have dividend
income to the full extent of the distribution. 2  It is essential, there-
fore, for attorneys to master the redemption provisions.
The fundamental issues addressed by the redemption provisions
is whether a distribution in redemption of stock will be taxed as a
dividend or as an exchange of a capital asset, as ordinary income or
capital gains. Section 3023 provides that property distributed in
redemption of stock4 will be treated as a dividend 5 unless it meets one
* B.A. 1972, Temple University; J.D. 1975, Dickinson School of Law. Asso-
ciate, Cleckner & Fearen, Harrisburg, Pa.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302-04.
2. See id. § 302(a).
3. Id.
4. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, "stock shall be treated as
redeemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in
exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or
held as treasury stock." Id. § 317(b).
5. The Internal Revenue Code defines a dividend as follows:
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'dividend' means
any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders-
(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913, or
(2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed as
of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any
distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to the
amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was
made.
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every distribution is made out
of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most recently
accumulated earnings and profits.
Id. § 316(a). By way of comparison, for nontax purposes the word "dividend" has
been defined as stockholders' withdrawals from accumulated profits, Lewis v.
of the following conditions: (1) The distribution is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend; (2) it is substantially disproportionate; (3)
it is in complete redemption of all the shareholder's stock of the
corporation; or (4) it is of stock issued by railroad corporations in
certain reorganizations.6 Section 3031 excludes redemptions "to pay
death taxes" from the general rule. Section 3048 governs tax conse-
quences of redemptions through use of related corporations. These
three sections attempt to tax properly transactions possessing charac-
teristics of both exchanges of capital assets and dividends.
The hybrid nature of a corporate distribution in redemption of
stock can be easily illustrated. When an individual sells stock, the
transaction normally is a sale of a capital asset. Assuming the stock
was held for more than six months and that a gain was realized on the
sale, the taxpayer will be taxed at the favorable capital gains rate.9
When a shareholder sells his stock to the issuing corporation, how-
ever, the transaction may resemble a dividend distribution. For exam-
ple, suppose the sole shareholder of a corporation initially owns 1,000
shares of stock. Each year the corporation redeems ten shares of
stock without distributing a dividend. Although the shareholder
owns fewer shares after each redemption, he still retains one hundred
percent ownership and the redemption was a mere disguise to get
money out of the corporation at favorable tax rates. In effect, it was
a distribution by the corporation resembling a dividend. When a
redemption resembles a dividend, it should be taxed as such. Other-
wise the unfavorable tax consequences related to dividends could be
O'Malley, 49 F. Supp. 173, 179 (D. Neb. 1943), distributions of profits and earnings,
In re Carlson's Estate, 16 App. Div. 2d 28, 31, 224 N.Y.S.2d 985, 989 (1962),
corporate profits set aside, declared or ordered by the corporate directors to be paid to
the stockholders upon demand or at a fixed time, In re Mortimer's Will, 12 Misc. 2d
744, 747, 171 N.Y.S.2d 635, 638 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Contrasted to this is the fact that
not every corporate distribution is a dividend. Commercial benefits to a stockholder
who buys the corporation's product at a discount is not a dividend. Northwest Eng'r
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Tax., 241 Wis. 324, 4 N.W.2d 198 (1942).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b). This exception is not of general
interest and will not be discussed further.
7. Id. § 303.
8. Id. § 304.
9. The special treatment accorded gains on the sale or exchange of capital
assets is based on social policy. In Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), the
Court held that favorable capital gains treatment was enacted to "relieve the taxpayer
from . . . excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital
investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conver-
sions." Id. at 106. See also, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260
(1958); Sherlock v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
802 (1961). The relief was motivated by the realization that there is a difference
between gain realized from activities of a single year, such as compensation for
services, receipt of dividends, interest, or the sale of stock in trade, and gain realized
from the sale or exchange of property that represents the appreciation of several
years. Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951); Rieger v.
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1943). Also, favorable capital gains treat-
ment serves to protect investment property. Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner,
supra; Martin v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
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avoided by having a corporation embark upon a program of stock
redemptions. When a redemption resembles a sale, on the other
hand, tax consequences should reflect this fact.
The redemption provisions of the 1954 Code have proved only
partially effective in their primary function of properly taxing transac-
tions resembling both exchanges and dividends. Some obstacles to
effective application of these provisions arise from the wording of the
sections themselves. For example, the phrase "not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" that appears in section 302(b)(1) is imprecise
and has caused questionable interpretations by the courts. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that the phrase contemplates
a meaningful reduction in the redeeming shareholder's interest.' 0
Such an interpretation, however, frequently precludes examination of
relevant considerations that would negate a finding of dividend equiv-
alence. With regard to section 302(b)(3) the effect of distributing a
debt instrument in exchange for stock is often litigated.'" Further-
more, special provisions for waiver of family attribution rules make
the effect of a redeemed shareholder's continued employment by the
corporation uncertain. Another important application of section
302(b)(3)-the sale of a corporation's stock to a third party as part
of a sale of the corporation-is also burdened with problems of
interpretation.
This article will survey sections 302, 303, and 304 of the Code,
examine the interpretations given them, and explore some of the
problems involved in their use. The article also will recommend
procedures that will allow practitioners to avoid some of the pitfalls
in stock redemptions.
B. Historical Treatment
The law of stock redemptions began with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue's administrative practice of treating stock dividends as in-
come. 2 Codified in 1916,"s this practice was declared unconstitu-
tional in Eisner v. Macomber.4 As a result a corporation could issue
a stock dividend with no tax consequences to its shareholders and
then redeem the shares of stock for cash. Since stock redemptions
10. See notes 55-61 and accompanying text infra.
I1. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.
14. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
were nontaxable, accumulated earnings and profits could be distrib-
uted without producing taxable dividend income to the shareholders.
Congress reacted quickly by enacting section 201(d) of the Revenue
Act of 1921, which instead of taxing the receipt of a stock dividend,
taxed the subsequent cancellation or redemption of the distributed
stock if made "at such time and in such manner as to make the dis-
tribution and cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent to the
distribution of a taxable dividend."'15 Congress broadened this provi-
sion in 1924 to include corporate redemptions of stock followed by a
stock dividend.' 6 Finally, in 1926 Congress altered the emphasis of
the redemption provision by eliminating any reference to shares is-
sued as a dividend. Dividend treatment of a redemption, thus, was
appropriate whenever cancellation or redemption in reality was a dis-
guised dividend. 7 No further changes were made until 1954.
Although the statutory language changed significantly from
1916 to 1926, many courts ignored the changes. Several courts
refused to treat a redemption of stock as a dividend if the taxpayer
proved that it was made in good faith' or that there was no relation-
ship between the redemption and a prior or subsequent stock issue. 19
Most courts looked to the net effect of the redemption, however, to
determine whether it was a disguised dividend. 0 These courts con-
sidered circumstances surrounding the redemption, placing special
emphasis on legitimate business purpose and resemblance to pro rata
distribution. Nevertheless, the haphazard manner in which courts
applied the net effect test led one court to observe that
the courts generally have not applied the 'net effect' test with
strict logic but have broadened its scope to include inquiry into
the possible existence of some 'legitimate business purpose,' for
the redemption, that is to say, a legitimate corporate purpose
as distinguished from a purpose to benefit the stockholder by
a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits exempt from
the imposition of income tax, . . . thus adding a question of
motive to the question of ultimate result. 21
15. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228.
16. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Stat. 253, 255.
17. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11.
18. E.g., Patty v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1938). See also, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935); Commissioner v. Cording-
ley, 78 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1935); Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1934).
19. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Rockwood, 83 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1936); H.F.
Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937); Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32 B.T.A. 222 (1935).
20. E.g., Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1941); Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp.
962 (N.D. W. Va. 1942).
21. Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954). For a discussion of the
history of § 115(g) see Adams, Some Tax Aspects of the Complete and Partial
Liquidation of Corporations, 28 N.C.L. REV. 36 (1949); Bittker & Redlich, Corporate
Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REV. 437 (1950); Danzig, Distributions
in Liquidations and Reorganizations, 26 T .xns 645 (1948); Darrell, Corporate
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 modified the stock redemp-
tion provisions: stock redemptions were distinguished from partial
liquidations;22 three new provisions allowing automatic capital gains
treatment of certain redemptions were added;2" and elaborate rules on
constructive ownership of stock were made applicable to stock re-
demptions.24 These modifications made the analysis of whether a
stock redemption should be treated as a sale or as a dividend more
Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1941); Gutkin
& Bech, Stock Redemptions as Taxable Events Under Section 115(g): The Impres-
sionistic Test, 80 J. AccotnrrANcy 285 (1945); The Tax Clinic, 78 J. AccouNTANcY
59, 60-61 (Lasser ed. 1944).
22. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302 with id. § 346. The draftsmen of
the 1954 Code made the following observations in this respect:
Existing law is complicated by the fact that stock redemptions are included
within the terms of the partial liquidation provisions. Thus, a redemption
of all of the stock of 1 of 2 sole shareholders of a corporation may
result in capital-gain treatment to the redeemed shareholder. The result oc-
curs, however, not by reason of the use of any particular assets of the corpo-
ration to effect the redemption but because the distribution when viewed at
the shareholder level is so disproportionate with respect to the outstanding
shareholder interests as not to be substantially equivalent to a dividend.
Your committee, as did the House bill, separates into their significant
elements the kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated in the defini-
tion of a partial liquidation. Those distributions which may have capital-
gain characteristics because they are not made pro rata among the various
shareholders would be subjected, at the shareholder level, to the separate
tests described in part I of this subchapter. On the other hand, those distri-
butions characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level by rea-
son of the assets distributed would be included as within the concept of a
partial liquidation.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954). Although the format of the
Internal Revenue Code distinguished redemptions from partial liquidations, commenta-
tors have not seen any clear distinction. Chiefly, the criticism has been that §
346(a) is written in terms of stock redemptions that are not essentially equivalent to
dividends and that there is no requirement in § 346(a) that there be a contraction of
corporate business. See B. BrrTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 9.6-.8 (1971); Moore, Dividend Equivalency-
Taxation of Distributions in Redemption of Stock, 19 TAx L. REV. 249 (1964).
23. See notes 91-138 and accompanying text infra.
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(1), 318. The rules relating to the
constructive ownership of stock can be divided into four basic categories: (a)
attribution from one family member to another; (b) attribution from a partnership,
trust, estate or corporation to an owner or beneficiary thereof or from such owner or
beneficiary to the related entity; (c) attribution from one of the aforementioned
entities to an individual and then from that individual to a family member, or from
one family member to another and then to one of the aforementioned entities; and
(d) attribution by reason of owning an option to acquire stock. The third type of
attribution is a combination of the first two types and has been called "sidewise"
attribution. Although this form of sidewise attribution is permissible, there are some
limitations. For instance, it is impermissible to attribute stock actually owned by one
family member to another family member and then reattribute that constructively
owned stock to a third family member. Similarly, stock owned constructively by a
corporation, trust, estate or partnership cannot be reattributed to another entity. Of
note is the fact that the attribution rules apply only to those sections that expressly
incorporate them. Id. § 318.
exact in some respects25 and more extensive in others.2 6 To a certain
extent, however, the problems existing before 1954 remained because
the phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend" was not deleted from
the Code.
II. Redemptions Not Equivalent to Dividends
A. Background
Section 302(b) (1) provides that a redemption will be treated as
a distribution in partial or full payment in exchange for stock if it "is
not essentially equivalent to a dividend."27  Because this language
had been difficult for courts to apply with consistency,28 the original
House bill omitted the provision.29 The Senate, however, felt com-
pelled to reinstate it:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which
stock may be redeeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules ap-
peared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly in the case of re-
demptions of preferred stock which might be called by the cor-
poration without the shareholder having any control when the
redemption may take place. Accordingly, your committee fol-
lows existing law by reinstating the general language indicating
that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or
full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend. 30
Although the motive underlying the Senate action seems to have been
protection of minority shareholders,31 this fact has received little
attention in subsequent interpretations of the phrase by the courts.
The net effect test continued to determine whether a distribution in
redemption of stock was essentially equivalent to a dividend.3 2
25. For example, when the corporation has redeemed all the stock of a
shareholder, a redemption will be treated as a sale. Id. § 302(b)(3).
26. This is primarily because of the attribution rules found in id. § 318.
27. Id. § 302(b)(1).
28. Courts have described the application of the equivalence test as a "morass,"
Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962), a "most exasperating
task," Thomas Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 78 (1960), a "nightmarish problem," Wilson v.
United States, 154 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1957), and a "vexing question,"
Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1962).
29. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., No. 3, 4209-14
(1954).
30. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1954) (emphasis added).
31. See Brown v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 477 F.2d
599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1972), in which the court said that §
302(b) (1) "must be construed narrowly since 'its major function was the narrow one
of immunizing redemptions of minority holdings of preferred stock.' " Id. at 246-47.
32. The income tax regulations provide the following guidance in determining
whether a distribution in redemption of stock is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend:
The question whether a distribution in redemption of stock of a shareholder
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the facts to be con-
sidered in making this determination is the constructive stock ownership of
such shareholder under section 318(a). All distributions in pro rata re-
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1. Flexible Net Effect Test.-Until 1970 most circuit courts
employed the so-called flexible net effect test." This analysis of
dividend equivalence was a factual one.
Whether or not a particular transaction involves the essen-
tial equivalent of a taxable dividend is a question of fact
[citations omitted]. There is no sole decisive test, [citation omit-
ted], but a number of judicial criteria or guideposts have been
determinative ....
Among these criteria are: the presence or absence of a
bona fide corporate business purpose; whether the action was
initiated by the corporation or by the shareholders; did the cor-
poration adopt any plan or policy of contraction, or did the
transaction result in a contraction of the corporation's business;
did the corporation continue to operate at a profit; whether the
transaction resulted in any substantial change in the proportion-
ate ownership of stock held by the shareholders; what were the
amounts, frequency, and significance of dividends paid in the
past; was there a sufficient accumulation of earned surplus to
cover the distribution, or was it partly from capital [citation
omitted].
34
The phrase "legitimate business purpose" has encompassed a
broad range of corporate objectives. One of these objectives has been
the redemption of stock to make it available for purchase by others.35
In Neff v. United States36 a corporation in need of additional capital
for diversification redeemed stock of the controlling shareholder for
resale at a profit. The court first recognized that a redemption for
the ultimate purpose of raising capital is a legitimate business pur-
pose. The redemption at issue, however, was found to be essentially
equivalent to a dividend because the shareholder's position remained
substantially unchanged and the objective could have been achieved
in a more appropriate manner.3 7  Therefore, the court effectively
demptions of a part of the stock of a corporation generally will be treated
as distributions under section 301 if the corporation has only one class of
stock outstanding.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 61, 74.
33. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966);
Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964); Ballenger v. 'United States, 301
F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); Heman v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958).
34. Heman v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 479, 486-87 (1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 227
(8th Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).
35. Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949) (redeemed stock
placed in treasury); Decker v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 326 (1959), aff'd per curiam,
286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960) (redemption to provide stock for proposed employee
stock purchase plan); H.F. Asmussen v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937)
(corporate purchase for contribution to an employee's association).
36. 305 F.2d 455 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
37. Id. at 457-58. In this case the corporation could have issued authorized but
unissued stock rather than rely on a stock redemption.
required that the asserted objective be closely related to the redemp-
tion and that more appropriate methods of reaching the objective be
unavailable.
In United States v. Carey"8 the owner of fifty percent of a
growing automobile dealership desired to sell his shares because he
could not devote sufficient time to the business. When no buyer
could be found at his high asking price, the corporation redeemed a
percentage of each stockholder's shares, which contracted the corpo-
ration's capital structure and effectively reduced the selling share-
holder's asking price. At the reduced price a buyer was found. Look-
ing at the entire transaction the court found that the redemption was
part of a legitimate corporate purpose--eliminating one shareholder
and obtaining another. The court noted that the redemption and sale
completely terminated the selling shareholder's interest in the corpo-
ration. Therefore, the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a
dividend.89
Neff and Carey involved the same basic transaction-a stock
redemption by a corporation in contemplation of a sale of stock to a
third party.40  Yet the tax consequences were different. The Carey
court was willing to examine the redemption and the subsequent sale
of stock,4 but the Neff court viewed only the redemption.42 Fur-
thermore, the required levels of proof of legitimate business purpose
differed greatly. Neff looked beyond the transaction to find private
benefit. 3 In Carey, however, the entire transaction was initiated to
benefit a single stockholder.
44
Improvement of a corporation's credit position is another busi-
ness purpose often cited as the reason for stock redemptions. 4 Not all
courts have found this motive persuasive. In Bradbury v. Commis-
sioner46 a corporation seeking a loan was told informally to improve
its credit by collecting the principal shareholder's debt. The corpora-
tion redeemed a portion of the shareholder's stock in cancellation of
his debt. This redemption was held essentially equivalent to a divi-
38. 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
39. Id. at 538-39.
40. These cases are readily distinguishable, but for purposes of this discussion
are sufficiently analogous.
41. 289 F.2d at 538-39.
42. 305 F.2d at 458.
43. Id. at 457-58.
44. See 289 F.2d at 539.
45. This purpose is alleged to have been the motivating factor behind redemp-
tions in several different contexts. In Koch v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1025
(1932), a redemption was made at the behest of a bank to reduce the number of the
corporation's outstanding shares as a prerequisite for a loan. In Allen v. Commis-
sioner, 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940), credit conditions required that debts of shareholders to
the corporation be eliminated by redemption of portions of their stock.
46. 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
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dend for two reasons. First, no meaningful change in the position of
the shareholder vis-a-vis the corporation and minority shareholders
had been effected by the redemption. Second, the evidence was in-
sufficient to prove that credit considerations actuated the redemp-
tion.47 In addition, the court stated that a sole or dominating share-
holder is but a "shadow of the corporation" itself and that in such
situations it is very difficult for a taxpayer to prove a corporate busi-
ness purpose entirely separate and distinct from his own purpose.
48
Another determinant of dividend equivalence under the flexible
net effect test was whether the redemption was initiated by the
corporation or the shareholder. 49  Analysis of this element was sub-
stantially the same as that given legitimate business purpose. For
example, in Kerr v. Commissioner0 a corporation redeemed some of
the stock of its sole shareholder allegedly at the suggestion of the
corporation's accountants and tax advisers. Disregarding the evi-
dence offered to prove this allegation, the court said, "It is hard to
believe that in a solely owned corporation, initiative can come from
the corporation as an entity rather than from the sole shareholder.
Any other belief would fly in the face of reality." 5
In summary, although courts using the flexible net effect test
paid verbal homage to many considerations, these generally were
disregarded after a finding that the redemption had caused no sub-
stantial reduction in the shareholder's interest in the corporation.52
47. Id. at 116.
48. In this regard the court said,
However, we believe that for business purpose to be of really meaningful
import the dichotomy between shareholder and corporation must be more
sharply drawn than is the case here. In a case such as the instant one,
while, on the verbal level, there may be a conceptually distinct corporate
and shareholder purpose, as a matter of economic import, it is unrealistic
to attempt to segregate them. The separateness of the shareholders in a
widely held corporation or the minority position of a particular shareholder
in a closely held corporation make considerations of legitimate corporate
business purpose a more eminently vital consideration than here where the
shareholder is but the shadow of the corporation.
Id. at 118. See also Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958).
49. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
50. 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 231.
52. See, e.g., Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964); Pacific
Veg. Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957); Earle v. Woodlaw,
245 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 942 (1957); Ferro v. Commissioner,
242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); Wilson v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 341 (N.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd, 257 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1958); Stolz v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 530, af'd
per curiam, 267 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1959).
This was especially true in cases involving a sole or controlling share-
holder.
5 3
2. Strict Net Effect Test.-The strict net effect test was more
limited in its scope of inquiry. Courts applying it did not consider
the various criteria used by courts applying the flexible test. Instead
these courts viewed only the consequences of the redemption. If a
dividend distribution would have produced the same results, the
redemption was held to be essentially equivalent to a dividend. 54
To determine dividend equivalence, many courts assumed a
hypothetical dividend in the same amount as the redemption and
compared the results. Another analytical tool was the pro rata
distribution, which many courts felt was an undeniable characteristic
of a dividend.55 In Northup v. United States56 a corporation attempt-
ing to revitalize its business implemented a plan to issue a preferred
stock dividend and have the existing shareholders give a substantial
portion of their common stock to their sons to induce them to stay in
the business. The corporation later redeemed the preferred stock.
The court combined the hypothetical dividend and pro rata distribu-
tion analyses and found as follows:
[T]he percentage of preferred stock payments that went to per-
sons who owned no common stock was 36% in 1945, 42.2%
in 1946 and 74.7% in 1947. Had dividends on common stock
been paid, these persons would have received nothing ....
Nor would the 'same effect' have followed with respect to
appellants Northup, Hine and Usher. These taxpayers owned
respectively in 1945, 24.8% of the common stock and 20%
of the outstanding preferred, 20.7% of the common and 8.5%
preferred, and 21.1 % common and 13.1 % preferred. Had the
funds expended to retire the preferred stock been applied instead
to dividends on the common, each would have received larger
payments than he did . . .57
The court, therefore, failed to find dividend equivalence. 5s
B. United States v. Davis59
In this landmark case the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
among the circuits and adopted the strict net effect test.60 Davis
53. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964); Neff v. United
States, 305 F.2d 455 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
54. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1964).
55. See Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1965); Himmel
v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
56. 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957).
57. Id. at 306.
58. Id. at 307.
59. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
60. Previously, there had been a conflict among the circuits over whether the
strict net effect test or the flexible net effect test should be applied. Compare Levin
v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967) and Hasbrook v. United States, 343
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965), with Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir.
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owned twenty-five percent of a corporation's common stock and his
wife owned another twenty-five percent. Soon after the original issue
he made a capital contribution in exchange for preferred stock to
enable the corporation to obtain a loan. The preferred stock was to
be redeemed after the loan had been repaid. During the interim
Davis bought the remaining fifty percent of the common stock and
distributed it to his children. When the corporation redeemed the
preferred stock the Service argued that the redemption was essentially
equivalent to a dividend. The lower courts disagreed, finding the
redemption to be a sale of a capital asset because it was the final step
in a course of action that had a legitimate business purpose.,'
On appeal, the Supreme Court first applied the constructive own-
ership rules of section 31862 to section 302(b) (l).6s Because all the
corporation's stock was held by Davis and his immediate family, the
Court viewed the case as one in which a sole shareholder had a
portion of his- stock redeemed. After reviewing the legislative history
of section 302(b)(1) and noting that its meaning was not free from
doubt, the Court held that consideration of a redemption's business
purpose was erroneous:
If a corporation distributes property as a simple dividend, the
effect is to transfer the property from the company to its share-
holders without a change in the relative economic interests or
rights of the stockholders. Where a redemption has that same
effect, it cannot be said to have satisfied the 'not essentially
equivalent to a dividend' requirement of § 302(b)(1). Rather,
to qualify for preferred treatment under that section, a redemp-
tion must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's
proportionate interest in the corporation. Clearly, taxpayer
here, who (after application of the attribution rules) was the
sole shareholder of the corporation both before and after the
redemption, did not qualify under this test.64
1966); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); Heman v.
Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960).
61. Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), alfd, 408
F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
62. See note 24 supra.
63. The court held that the attribution rules were applicable to § 302(b) (1) for
the following reasons:
In subsection (c) of § 302, the attribution rules are made specifically ap-
plicable 'in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this section.'
Applying this language, both courts below held that § 318(a) applies to all
of § 302, including § 302(b)(1)-a view in accord with the decisions of
the other courts of appeals, a longstanding treasury regulation, and the opin-
ion of the leading commentators.
397 U.S. at 306 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). Justices Douglas and Brennan and Chief
Justice Burger dissented, arguing that a redemption for a legitimate business purpose
The Supreme Court focused on only one attribute of a dividend
in Davis-its failure to affect the economic interests of the sharehold-
ers inter se and vis-a-vis the corporate-and held that a redemption
with the same characteristic is essentially equivalent to a dividend. By
narrowing the scope of inquiry in this manner, the Court not only
struck down the flexible net effect test, but also altered the applica-
tion of the strict net effect test. This action certainly exceeded the
limited question of whether the strict or flexible test should be used to
determine dividend equivalence, which had led the Court to grant
certiorari in the first place. 5 It is not clear why the Court rejected
the hypothetical dividend and pro rata distribution devices in favor of
an analysis couched in terms of a meaningful reduction of a share-
holder's proportionate interest in the corporation. One possibility
may be that in a corporation with a complex capital structure, a
hypothetical dividend often will not have the same consequences as a
redemption, especially when the redemption is of preferred stock held
disproportionately.6 6 Another reason may be that a meaningful re-
duction in a shareholder's interest may not occur even when a
distribution is not pro rata. Indeed, following Davis the court in
Brown v. United States6 7 found that a distribution was not pro rata,
but held the redemption equivalent to a dividend because there was
no meaningful reduction of the taxpayer's proportionate interest in
the corporation.
One question caused by the Davis decision relates to its use of
the phrase "relative economic interests or rights of the stockhold-
ers."6 8  Does it address only economic interests and rights? In
Grabowski Trust69 this language was interpreted to mean that the
strict net effect test "measures whether the distribution has altered the
shareholder's control over the corporation or the shareholder's rights
to future earnings."7  On the other hand, the court in Wright v.
United States7 said, "We . . . think that it is improper to refer to the
'net effect' standard as the 'net economic test', . . . since a mean-
ingful change in shareholders' voting power is a relevant inquiry."2
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend and that to hold otherwise would effectively
cancel § 302(b)(1) from the Code. Id. at 314 (dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 303.
66. See Brown v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio), a!l'd, 477 F.2d
599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1971).
67. Id. The Tax Court in Grabowski Trust v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650
(1972), expressed uncertainty over whether a non-pro-rata redemption would "neces-
sarily satisfy the 'meaningful reduction of the shareholders' proportionate interest'
requirement of Davis." Id. at 659.
68. 397 U.S. at 313.
69. 58 T.C. 650 (1972).
70. Id. at 656.
71. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 609. An opposite result was reached in Brown v. United States, 345
F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 477 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011
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The Service has continued to follow its pre-Davis position that analy-
sis of redemptions should include changes in both economic and
voting rights. 71 In Himmel v. Commissioner7 4 a corporation had
a capital structure composed of one class of common stock and two
classes of preferred. The complexity of the capital structure forced
the court, in an analysis of the possible dividend equivalence of a
preferred stock redemption, to focus on the redemption's effect on
the shareholders' rights. These rights were said to include the
rights "(1) to vote and thereby exercise control, (2) to partici-
pate in current earnings and accumulated surplus, and (3) to share
in net assets on liquidation." '7  There is no reason to believe that
the word "economic" modifying "interest" in the Davis formula-
tion was also intended to modify the word "rights." The two words
are separated by a disjunctive and, therefore, do not share a common
modifier.
Another uncertain phrase in Davis is "meaningful reduction.""'
The term does not lend itself readily to mathematical equations and
uniform results: reductions of fifteen percent
77 and two percent 78
have been held meaningful, while reductions of nine percent79 and
seven percent 0 have not. In a post-Davis ruling the IRS concluded
that reducing a shareholder's voting power from fifty-seven to fifty
percent constituted a meaningful reduction.8 '
(1972). There is thus a split as to whether courts should only analyze changes in
economic interests or changes in both economic and voting interest. In Wright v.
United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that "'voting power' may
indeed eventually have an economic effect." Id. at 609 n.18. The weight of
authority supports this view.
73. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975 rr. REV. BULL. No. 47, at 10.
74. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964).
75. Id. at 817. Discussing the complexity of determining dividend equivalence
when a complex corporate structure exists, the court said,
[D]ifficult problems are raised when a corporation has more than one class
of stock. The additional class will often be a preferred, which typically has
no voting rights, has preferential though limited rights to participate in
earnings, and has rights to share in liquidation only to the extent of capital
contributed, and perhaps accrued but unpaid dividends. Redemption of
some preferred stock consequently may cause different changes in a share-
holder's total rights than would redemption of common. Even more is
this so when the preferred and common are not held in the same propor-
tions by the same shareholders. Shares of different classes should there-
fore not casually be lumped together.
Id. at 818.
76. 397 U.S. at 313.
77. Smith v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 586 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
78. Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 Ctm. BULL. 161.
79. Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973).
80. Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965).
81. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 47, at 10.
C. Criticism of the Davis Approach
The Davis test can be weighed most logically by considering its
effect on the underlying purposes of the statutory provision. Section
302 was enacted to prevent tax avoidance by shareholders who would
disguise dividends as stock redemptions. 82  Subsection (b)(1) was
included in the 1954 Code to add flexibility to an otherwise "unne-
cessarily restrictive" section 302.83 The purposes of section
302(b)(1), then, are flexibility and prevention of tax avoidance.
Davis, on the other hand, has ruled out the question of tax avoidance
as a relevant issue and has locked the courts into an analysis that
considers only one factor-whether a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation has been ef-
fected by the redemption.
Because of its failure to meet the statutory objective of flexibili-
ty, Davis has been judicially criticized. The dissenting Justices in
Davis chided the majority for effectively destroying the viability of the
subsection.84  Three years later in a dissent to a certiorari denial,
Justices Powell, Douglas, and Blackmun argued that the Supreme
Court should reconsider its holding in Davis.s5 In that case a closely
held corporation desperately needed a loan for a new barge. Funds
proved to be unavailable, however, without a repayment guarantee
from the Federal Maritime Commission. The Commission ordered
the corporation to increase its capital base, which was done by issuing
a class of nonvoting, nondividend-paying, noncumulative preferred
stock that could not be redeemed until the loan was fully repaid.
When the corporation was able to redeem this new class of stock, the
Service, pursuant to the rule in Davis, taxed the distribution as
ordinary income. The dissenting Justices presented three arguments
against this result: (1) the ease of administration provided by the
Davis test is contrary to the subsection's goal of flexibility; (2) when
tax avoidance is not a motive for a redemption, it is improper to tax
the distribution as a dividend; and (3) when a redemption is a mere
return of capital, it is unduly harsh to tax it at ordinary income
rates.86 The last point is significant because it recognizes that there
are more attributes of a dividend than the one expressed in Davis. For
instance, a dividend does not reduce stated capital. In fact, state
82. See notes 12-24 and accompanying text supra.
83. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
84. 397 U.S. at 314 (dissenting opinion). The dissent overreacts; situations
exist that are still covered by § 302(b)(1). See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a)-(b)
(1955); B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 9.26 (1971); McAndrews, Supreme Court's Davis Decision: Does It
Do Away With the 302(b)(1) Redemption?, 32 J. TAx. 328 (1970).
85. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, denying cert. to Miele v. Commis-
sioner, No. 72-1031 (3d Cir., Jan. 30, 1972).
86. Id. at 985.
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corporate codes generally prohibit the payment of dividends from
stated capital.8 7  Logically, dividend equivalence should involve an
examination of all attributes of dividends, except those contrived by
the taxpayer to effect tax avoidance.
Although the difficulty of gaining acceptance of an approach
broader than Davis is obvious, several cogent arguments can be
raised. First, several Justices do not believe that Davis is correct.88
Second, Davis was a limited decision. The only issue presented was
whether a legitimate business purpose will destroy the dividend equiv-
alence of a redemption. Whether the only dividend attribute to be
considered in applying section 302(b) (1) is its failure to affect
shareholder rights was not at issue.8 9 Third, a comparison of all the
legitimate attributes of a redemption and all the attributes of a
dividend is a proper examination in a test of equivalence. Further-
more, it complies with treasury regulations providing that equivalence
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." Last, a
broad-based examination need not focus on the redemption's busi-
ness purpose. On the contrary, as illustrated by the dissenting Jus-
tices in Albers,91 it looks to the substance of the transaction. If the
redemption constitutes the return of a capital contribution, the busi-
ness motivation is irrelevant. The tax motivation is very important,
however, because -the form may ,be a return of capital, but the
substance a distribution of earnings and profits.
In addition to these substantive arguments, equitable administra-
tion of taxation statutes should be considered. The overriding pur-
pose of section 302 is prevention of tax avoidance. 92 Therefore,
distributions that are not so motivated should remain untouched by
87. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1500 (West 1955 & Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1967 & Supp. 1975).
88. Justices Powell, Douglas, and Blackmun dissented in Albers v. Commission-
er, 414 U.S. 982 (1973). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Chief Justice Burger
dissented in Davis v. United States, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
89. The Court's holding in this regard must be considered as dictum:
We conclude that the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in looking for
a business purpose and considering it in deciding whether the redemption
was equivalent to a dividend. Rather, we agree with the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit that 'the business purpose of a transaction is irrele-
vant in determining dividend equivalence,' under 302(b) (1).
397 U.S. at 312.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
91. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, denying cert. to Miele v. Commis-
sioner, No. 72-1031 (3d Cir., Jan. 30, 1972).
92. See notes 12-24 and accompanying text supra.
the section. This is true even though the IRS will be required to
examine taxpayers' motives. This examination will not interfere
unduly with the Service's functions and is a relevant inquiry in several
other areas of taxation.93
III. Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions
Section 302(b) (1) provides that if a redemption is substantially
disproportionate and after the redemption the shareholder owns less
than fifty percent of the total voting stock, the distribution will be
treated as partial or full payment for the stock. The rationale of the
fifty percent rule is that a shareholder's reduction is not significant if
he continues to control the corporation through ownership of more
than half the stock.94 A redemption is deemed to be substantially dis-
proportionate when the shareholders' percentage of ownership of out-
standing voting stock after the redemption is less than eighty percent
of his percentage of ownership prior to the redemption. If there is
more than one class of stock, the percentage ratios are computed with
reference to the fair market value of the stock.95 This section cannot
be circumvented by redeeming stock of separate shareholders at
different times. If the net effect of a series of redemptions is the
same as a substantially proportionate redemption, favorable tax treat-
ment will not result.96 The attribution of ownership may also cause
problems in applying this section.97
In applying this explicit provision the only questions are how to
determine the amount of stock outstanding and the amount owned by
the shareholder. These determinations normally are made by a brief
examination of the corporate balance sheet and stock transfer records,
but are not always obvious. As an illustration, assume that X
corporation had outstanding 1,000 shares of common stock and that
93. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302(c)(2)(B), 357(b).
94. The original House version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1943 did not
include this fifty percent requirement. As a result the provision was criticized in the
minority report and corrected when it went to the Senate.
Another mechanical rule, which should be critically appraised, is the'substantially disproportionate redemption' rule .... The test provided is
whether, after the redemption, the shareholders' percentage of participating
stock ownership is less than 80% of his percentage prior to distribution.
Assume that stockholder X owns 9,000 out of 10,000 (90%) outstanding
shares of common stock .... Stockholder X is in control of the corpora-
tion and wishes to realize in part upon its earnings and profits without ordi-
nary income tax consequences and without substantially relinquishing con-
trol of the enterprise. Under the bill, he may cause redemption of 721
shares, retain 71% of control, and obtain capital-gain treatment of his gain
upon the redeemed stock. The adequacy of this provision is open to ques-
tion.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., No. 3, 4615-16 (1954)
(H.R. minority view).
95. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (2) (C).
96. Id. § 302(b)(2)(D).
97. E.g., id. § 318(a)(4).
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A and B each owned 100 shares. Suppose further that the corpora-
tion redeemed fifty shares from each in exchange for a debenture
convertible into forty shares of common and a warrant to purchase
twenty shares of common. The outstanding stock prior to the re-
demption is easy to calculate-i ,000 shares. After the redemption,
however, a more difficult question arises: Is the outstanding stock
composed of those shares actually outstanding or those outstanding
plus the shares represented by the convertible debentures and war-
rants? The IRS has indicated that the latter alternative is the correct
one and that A and B would fail to satisfy section 302(b) (2).98 The
computation is as follows:
Percentage of ownership prior to redemption: 10% (100/1000)
Stock owned by A or B Stock outstanding
actually 100 1,000 shares
constructively 0
total 100
Percentage of ownership after the redemption: 11.46% (110/960)










Finally, it should be noted that a twenty percent reduction in the
number of shares owned will not satisfy the test because the redemp-
tion will also decrease the number of shares outstanding.99
98. Rev. Rul. 68-601, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 124. Note that in the formula in
text, 960 shares of stock are considered outstanding, not 1020.
Since the warrants and convertible debentures in this case constitute
options under section 318(a) (4) of the Code, it is held that under section
302(b)(2) of the Code there should be considered as issued and outstand-
ing, on a shareholder by shareholder basis without regard to the rights of
unrelated shareholders to acquire unissued stock, those shares which a given
shareholder may acquire by exercising his warrants and converting his
debentures and those shares which that shareholder would constructively
own by reason of other shareholders exercising their warrants and convert-
ing their debentures.
Id. Contra, Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964).
99. A simple formula to determine the number of shares to be redeemed when
one shareholder is involved is as follows:
IV. Termination of Shareholder's Interest
A. Statutory Scheme
Section 302(b)(3) of the 1954 Code directs that a redemption
shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock "if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of
the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder."'' 0 Although
this provision did not appear in the Code prior to 1954, the Service
for several years had treated a redemption in complete termination of
a shareholder's interest as not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
A cancellation or redemption by a corporation of a portion of
its stock pro rata among all the shareholders will generally be
considered as effecting a distribution essentially equivalent to a
dividend . . . . On the other hand, a cancellation or redemp-
tion by a corporation of all the stock of a particular shareholder,
so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of
the corporation, does not effect a distribution of a taxable divi-
dend.101
1. Effect of Debt Instrument.-If in exchange for all a share-
holder's stock the corporation pays cash, the transaction falls within
the literal requirements of the provision. Problems may arise, how-
ever, when a corporation pays for the stock with a debt instrument.
The IRS may disregard the form of the note and hold that it is
essentially an equity security that will not comply with the statutory
requirements. 2 Warning that these transactions will be closely
N S = minimum number of shares to be redeemed;
$= - N = number of voting shares owned by the redeeming
5 - 4r shareholder prior to the redemption; and
r = the ratio of the redeeming shareholder's voting stock
to the outstanding stock prior to the redemption.
If there are multiple redemptions, three additional computations are required: (1)
Determine the aggregate number of shares held by all of the redeeming shareholders
and use this figure for "N"; (2) determine the ratio of their combined holdings to the
total outstanding stock and use this figure for "r"; (3) the above two computations
will give you "S", which is apportioned among the shareholders according to their
proportionate interest in the corporation. See Freret, A Simplified Computation for
Substantially Disproportionate Stock Redemptions, 37 TAXES 767, 772 (1959).
100. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(3).
101. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-l(a)(2). See also Howell v. Commis-
sioner, 26 T.C. 846 (1956); Tiffany v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1443 (1951); Rev.
Rul. 54-408,1954-2 CUM. BULL. 165.
102. To qualify an instrument as debt for income tax purposes requires (1) an
unconditional obligation to pay a sum certain, (2) a fixed maturity date (not
unreasonably far in the future), (3) interest payable in all events, (4) rights equal to
all general creditors, and (5) no voting rights. See generally, e.g., Harlan v. United
States, 409 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Snyder Bros., 367 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1966); Fellinger v. United States, 363 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1966). In
addition to the formal terms of the instrument, the courts will often go beyond the
four corners of the instrument. The following factors have been considered in this
respect: (I) excessive debt-equity ratio; (2) intent to create a creditor-debtor
relationship; and (3) pro rata holding of stock and debt. See generally, e.g., A.R.
Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1970); P.M. Fin. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1962); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399
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scrutinized, the Service in 1972 issued a revenue procedure declaring
that no revenue ruling or determination ordinarily will be given when
notes payable over a period in excess of fifteen years are used or when
the stock is held in escrow or by the shareholder as security for the
notes and there is a possibility that the stock will be returned to the
shareholder upon the corporation's default. 10 3  The courts have not
always accepted the implicit argument in the Service's position. In
Estate of Mathis' a corporation redeemed all a shareholder's stock
with a down payment of $26,130 and monthly payments of $500
until a total of $100,000 was reached. The stock was held by an
escrow agent until the corporation's final payment. The Service
argued that because the shareholder did not have his stock redeemed
until the final payment was received, the down payment and monthly
installments were dividends taxable to the shareholder. Rejecting
this argument, the Tax Court held that a redemption is complete once
there is a binding redemption contract and that passage of title only
upon final payment will not invalidate such a contract.1
0 5
2. Attribution of Ownership Rules.-The constructive owner-
ship rules of section 318 apply to section 302(b)(3). Thus, if a
husband and wife each own fifty percent of a corporation and the
corporation redeems all the husband's stock, he will continue to be
deemed to hold all the outstanding stock of the corporation because
of the attribution rules. 10 6 Section 302(c)(2) provides, however,
that for purposes of section 302 (b)(3) the family attribution rules
can be waived if three conditions are met: (1) All the shareholder's
interest in the corporation (other than his interest as a creditor) is
terminated; (2) the redeeming shareholder does not reacquire any
interest within ten years from the date of the redemption; and (3) the
(2d Cir. 1957); Gooding Amus. Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
In addition, the Tax ,Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415, 83 Stat.
487, incorporated § 385 into the Internal Revenue Code, giving the Commissioner
broad authority to distinguish corporate stock and debt. For general discussions in
this area see Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt, 26 TAx
L. REV. 369 (1971); Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAx L. REV.
509 (1970).
103. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 719; Rev. Rul. 57-295, 1957-2 CuM.
BULL. 227, which held that a redemption for cash plus promissory notes payable over
a ten-year period falls within § 302(b)(3).
104. 47 T.C. 248 (1966).
105. See Hoffman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 218 (1966); Lewis v. Commission-
er, 47 T.C. 129 (1966).
106. See note 24 supra.
redeeming shareholder files the necessary agreements with the Secre-
tary.
10 7
(a) Termination of all interest.-A valid waiver of family attri-
bution can occur only if the shareholder terminates all interest in the
corporation, including his interest as an officer, director, or employee.
The only exception is that the redeeming shareholder may retain an
interest as a creditor.
Beyond these obvious categories of interests, decisions of the
Service and the courts must be consulted to avoid losing the benefits
of section 302(c)(2). Revenue Ruling 70-104 dealt with a corpora-
tion owned entirely by a father and his children. The corporation
redeemed all the father's stock and immediately thereafter entered
into an agreement for the father's services as a consultant. The IRS
held that these services were an interest in the corporation within the
meaning of section 302(c) (2) (A) (i) and, therefore, the family
attribution rules could not be waived. 10 8
In Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner'0 9 the Tax Court consid-
ered whether performance of accounting services for a corporation
precluded a redeeming shareholder from meeting the termination of
interest requirement. The taxpayer and his son each had a one-third
interest in the corporation. Prior to acquiring his interest, taxpayer
was a certified public accountant and he continued until his death to
be associated with accounting firms, some of which did work for the
corporation. After taxpayer's stock was redeemed and he resigned as
an officer and director, his accounting firm continued to render
services to the corporation. The IRS argued that these services
precluded taxpayer from waiving the family attribution rules, but the
court disagreed. Referring to Revenue Ruling 70-104 it held that
accounting services were more "circumscribed" than consultation
services and that in enacting section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) Congress was
concerned with redeeming shareholders who retained a "financial
stake" or some "corporate involvement." An independent contractor
was found to be outside this category. Because the taxpayer was an
independent contractor when he rendered services to the corporation,
he was held to have met the requirements of section
302(c)(2)(A)(i). 1 0  Similarly, a landlord-tenant relationship re-
tained by a redeeming shareholder has been held free from attack.' 1 '
In Revenue Ruling 70-426 the Service determined that a share-
holder who continued to be a trustee of a voting trust was precluded
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c) (2).
108. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 66.
109. 61 T.C. 554 (1974).
110. Id. at 561.
111. When a corporation distributes real estate to a shareholder who then leases
it back to the corporation, no prohibited relation exists under § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).




from waiving the family attribution rules. "By remaining as a voting
trustee, the taxpayer will continue to have an interest in the corpora-
tion by having the right to vote the stock which is held by the
trust."112  The shareholder's right to vote illustrated the type of
corporate involvement alluded to in Lennard that will preclude a
finding of a complete termination of interest.' Corporate involve-
ment also can arise when a redeeming shareholder accepts a debt
obligation for his stock and retains too many protective devices. In
one case a corporation agreed to allow taxpayer's nominee to sit on
the board of directors as long as the debt remained outstanding.
Although the corporation was required to pay the nominated director,
the agreement was made solely to protect the redeeming shareholder's
interest. The Service held, therefore, that the nominee was taxpayer's
agent and that the conditions of the termination of interest rule had
not been met.' The ruling continued, however, by stating that a
creditor may attend board meetings without adverse effect on his
ability to waive family attribution." 5
In summary, shareholders of family-owned corporations must be
wary of retaining too close an interest in the corporation after a
section 302(b)(3) redemption. Although some ties are permissible,
a finding of corporate involvement or financial dependence on the
corporation will render waiver of family attribution rules unavailable.
(b) Reacquisition of interest within ten years.-With the ex-
ception of reacquisition of stock by bequest or inheritance, it is gen-
erally impermissible, at the cost of losing waiver of family attribution,
for an individual to reacquire any interest in the corporation within
112. Rev. Rul. 71-426, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 173.
113. See Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 562 (1974).
114. Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 68.
115. With regard to retention of rights by a creditor the regulations provide the
following:
For the purpose of section 302(c)(2) (A) (i), a person will be considered
to be a creditor only if the rights of such person with respect to the corpora-
tion are not greater or broader in scope than necessary for the enforcement
of his claim. Such claim must not in any sense be proprietary and must
not be subordinate to the claims of general creditors. An obligation in the
form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary interest. For example, if
under the terms of the instrument the corporation may discharge the princi-
pal amount of its obligation to a person by payments, the amount or cer-
tainty of which are dependent upon the earnings of the corporation, such
a person is not a creditor of the corporation. Furthermore, if under the
terms of the instrument the rate of purported interest is dependent upon
earnings, the holder of such instrument may not, in some cases, be a
creditor.
Treas. 'Reg. §. 1.302-4(d), T.D. 6152, as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 CuM. BULL.
126.
ten years from the date of the redemption.116 One uncertain area is
whether an acquisition within ten years by an individual from whom
stock is attributable to the redeeming shareholder complies with sec-
tion 302(c)(2). In Revenue Ruling 71-562117 a father and son each
owned one-half of a corporation's stock. The corporation redeemed
all the father's stock and he filed the agreement necessary to waive the
family attribution rules. Within ten years a second son acquired
shares of the corporation. The Service held the waiver applicable to
the reacquisition provision as well as to the redemption provision of
section 302(b)(3). Therefore, the father continued to comply with
the requirements of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). Although the ruling
is logical-since attribution from family members is waived at the
time of redemption, it is logical to waive attribution from family
members who subsequently become stockholders-its validity is ques-
tionable. The express words of the statute allow waiver of family
attribution only for the purpose of the redemption described in sec-
tion 302(b)(3). i s Waiver for other purposes, such as reacquisi-
tion, is unauthorized by the Code.
Another ruling involved the reacquisition of stock by two broth-
ers as executors in a state that allows executors to vote the estate's
stock. The IRS viewed this as merely a reacquisition by bequest and
held it in compliance with section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii)." 9
(c) Filing of agreement.-The redeeming shareholder must file
an agreement to notify the Secretary of any reacquisition of inter-
est and to keep necessary records. 20 The agreement must be timely
filed with the income tax return for the year in which the redemption
took place. 2' Courts have been lenient, however, in applying this
time limit. In United States v. Van Keppel 22 the redeeming share-
116. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii).
117. Rev. Rul. 71-562, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 173.
118. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c) (2) (A).
119. Rev. Rul. 72-380, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 201.
120. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii). The regulations provide,
(a) The agreement specified in section 302(c)(2) (A) (iii) shall be in
the form of a separate statement in duplicate signed by the distributee and
attached to his return timely filed for the year in which the distribution de-
scribed in section 302(b)(3) occurs. The agreement shall recite that the
distributee has not acquired any interest in the corporation (as described in
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i)) since such distribution, and that he agrees to
notify the district director of internal revenue for the district in which such
return is filed of any acquisition of such an interest in the corporation
within 30 days after such acquisition if such acquisition occurs within 10
years from the date of such distribution.
(b) The distributee who files an agreement under section 302(c)(2)
(A) (iii) shall retain copies of income tax returns and any other records in-
dicating fully the amount of tax which would have been payable had the
redemption been treated as a distribution subject to section 301.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(a)-(b), T.D. 6152, as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 CuM. BULL.
126.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(a)-(b), T.D. 6152, as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2
CuM. BULL. 126.




holder inadvertently failed to file the agreement on time. The court
cautioned that taxpayer had no absolute right to file the agreement
late, but held the late filing valid, noting that it was the produce of
mistake not a change in an election, that the government's interests
were not prejudiced, and that the IRS was not misled or inconven-
ienced. The court described its decision as analogous to the Service's
administrative practice of accepting amended returns.1 23
A contrary decision was reached in Fehrs Finance Co. v. Com-
missioner.124 The redeeming shareholder in that case argued that the
redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. On appeal
taxpayer also alleged a complete termination of his interest in the
corporation. The circuit court rejected this argument, however, be-
cause stock owned by his wife and children was attributed to him.
Taxpayer then argued that his filing of a section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii)
agreement after the trial was substantial compliance with the provi-
sion. The court disagreed, holding that to wait until after trial is too
long.
125
In general, the owner of a beneficial interest in stock must file
the required agreement. Thus, if stock held by a voting trust is
redeemed, the holder of the voting trust certificate, rather than the
voting trustee, must file.' 26 Similarly, a beneficiary of an ordinary
trust is the proper party to file the agreement. 21 In addition, re-
demptions in community property states require both the shareholder
and his spouse to file agreements to waive family attribution. In
these states each spouse is deemed to receive one-half of the redemp-
tion price.
28
When an estate desires to waive family attribution, on the other
hand, it has been held proper for the estate, rather than the benefi-
ciaries, to file the nonreacquisition agreement. 2 9 The Tax Court in
Crawford based its decision on the estate's status as a "distributee,"
the party statutorily required to file. 3 0  The court, however, may
have misconstrued the term "distributee." Waiver of family attribu-
tion is an exception to the general rule and should be interpreted
123. Accord, Pearce v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
124. 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973).
125. Id. at 189.
126. Rev. Rul. 71-262, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 110.
127. Rev. Rul. 72-471, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 201.
128. Rev. Rul. 71-138, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 109.
129. Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830 (1973).
130. Id. at 835.
narrowly. Additionally, the language of the waiver provisions illus-
trates congressional intent to disallow their availability when a possi-
bility of tax avoidance exists. 13' By considering the decedent's estate
as the distributee of the redemption price, the decedent's family
members and beneficiaries are insulated from the limitations of sec-
tion 302(c)(2) dealing with termination and acquisition of inter-
est. Therefore, Crawford's characterization of the estate as distribu-
tee is suspect and of dubious precedential value." 2
(d) Limitations on waiver of attribution.-Waiver of attribution
is expressly limited to ownership attributable to and from family
members. 1 3  Neither a trust nor an individual can waive attribution
from a corporation.13 Furthermore, the waiver is only for the
purpose of determining an individual's stock ownership in the re-
demption of his own stock and does not eliminate family attribution
for other purposes.3 5 Thus, when a corporation's stock is owned by
a father, his son, and a trust of which the son is the sole beneficiary
and the corporation redeems all the stock actually owned by the son
and the trust, two consequences will follow. On filing of a section
302(c)(2)(A)(iii) agreement, the son will not be considered as
owning his father's stock for purposes of section 302(b)(3). The
father's stock, however, will be attributed to the son for the purpose
of reattributing it to the trust.'36
(e) The "look-back" rule.-A limitation on waiver of family
attribution is provided in section 302(c)(2)(B). If the redeemed
stock was acquired within ten years prior to the redemption from a
family member or if a family member acquired any stock from the
redeeming shareholder within ten years prior to the redemption, the
waiver of attribution allowed by section 302(c)(2)(A) will not be
available. 37  Relief from this limitation can be obtained by showing
that the redeeming shareholder's acquisition or disposition of stock
was not made for the principal purpose of federal tax avoidance. 13 8
For an illustration of this provision's rationale, assume that Husband
wanted to give $100,000 to Wife, but had no cash because all his
assets were tied up in his solely owned corporation. He considered
redeeming some of his stock, but realized that this would result in a
dividend to him. Instead, he transferred stock to Wife and had the
131. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c) (2).
132. The Commissioner nonacquiesced in Crawford at 1974-2 CUM. BULL. 5.
See Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 122; Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL.
106. The Tax Court has refused to extend Crawford to trusts. Haft Trust v. Com-
missioner, 61 T.C. 398 (1973); 62 T.C. (1974); see note 136 and accompanying text
infra.
133. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2)(A).
134. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106.
135. Id.
136. Rev. Rul. 72-472, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 202.





corporation redeem it. If family attribution rules were validly
waived, Husband would avoid taxes by having the redemption taxed
at capital gains rates to Wife. This type of tax avoidance is thwarted
by section 302(c)(2)(B), the so-called ten-year "look back" rule.
This subjective provision focuses on a single motive and is normally
of little concern. Reasonable business objectives will prevent the
operation of the section. For example, when a father gave his son
stock in his corporation to interest the son in corporate operations and
the son had his stock redeemed within ten years, the Service allowed
the son to waive family attribution."3 9
B. Use of Buy-Sell Agreements To Reduce a Corporation's Price
Frequently in the sale of a closely held or solely owned corpora-
tion, the purchaser (assuming that he agrees to purchase stock in-
stead of assets) may be unwilling or unable to buy all the stock and
the corporation may have excess cash on its books. A distribution by
the corporation to the selling shareholder, therefore, will be neces-
sary to lower the price of the stock to be purchased.
1. From the Seller's Viewpoint.-Under the 1954 Code the
selling shareholder or shareholders can lower the stock price, dispose
of their entire interest in the corporation, and avoid dividend conse-
quences by engaging in a two-step transaction. First, the purchaser
should be sold a portion of the stock. Second, the corporation should
redeem the remaining stock from the sellers. Because this redemp-
tion is in complete termination of the seller's interest, it will qualify
for capital gain treatment.
140
Under the 1939 Code selling shareholders could achieve the
same result. In Zenz v. Quinlivan'4 1 a woman owned all the stock
of a corporation. A prospective buyer, worried about tax liabilities
inherent in the accumulated earnings and profits, bought a portion of
the stock and three weeks later the corporation redeemed the seller's
remaining stock, completely exhausting the accumulated earnings and
profits. The Sixth Circuit upheld the transaction:
We cannot concur with the legal proposition enunciated by
the District Court that a corporate distribution can be essentially
equivalent to a taxable dividend even though that distribution
extinguishes the shareholder's interest in the corporation. To
139. Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 179.
140. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3).
141. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
the contrary, we are satisfied that where the taxpayer effects
a redemption which completely extinguishes the taxpayer's inter-
est in the corporation, and does not retain any beneficial interest
whatever, that such transaction is not the equivalent of the dis-
tribution of a taxable dividend .... 142
Although a sale-redemption transaction should begin with the
sale, it has been held that a redemption before the sale will not result
in dividend treatment.143 The court in United States v. Carey
144
found that because the related transactions were meant to effect a
transfer of stock ownership, the distribution in redemption of stock
was not a taxable dividend. It must be observed, however, that the
court viewed the redemption as one step in an integrated plan. If a
redemption and the termination of a shareholder's interest appear
disjointed, the redemption may be treated as a dividend. 45
The apparent rationale of Carey is that when the substance of a
transaction is the same as if the sale had preceded the redemption, the
same tax consequences should result. An extension of this reasoning
would allow capital gains treatment when a corporation, as part of an
integrated plan to transfer stock ownership, distributes property to
selling shareholders without a redemption to reduce the value of their
stock. The only difference between this transaction and the Carey
transaction is a transfer of paper. The Fifth Circuit reached this
exact conclusion in Casner v. Commissioner,'46 noting that the distri-
bution was but one step in a "pre-conceived multi-step plan" and that
it would not have occurred "but for the contemplated stock sale.' 7
While a stock sale and redemption transaction need not follow
the technically correct course for the seller to get favorable capital
gains treatment, the buyer should carefully construct the transaction
to avoid having a constructive dividend attributed to him.
2. From the Buyer's Viewpoint.-If a buyer contracts to pur-
chase all the stock of a corporation and after buying it attempts to
recoup part of the purchase price by redeeming stock, clearly this
redemption will be treated as a dividend because none of the require-
ments of section 302(b) have been met. Furthermore, most at-
tempts to avoid this result are likely to fail. If the buyer attempts to
restructure the deal, it is likely that courts or the Service will see
through the new form of the transaction, similar to the Supreme
Court's reaction in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. 4 " In that case
142. Id. at 917.
143. United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 538. Contra, Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.
1965).
146. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
147. Id. at 397.
148. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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the Court frustrated the selling shareholder's attempt to restructure
the transaction and avoid income tax at the corporate level. 14 9 Even
though there was no written agreement between the corporation and
the prospective buyer, the Court felt that negotiations had progressed
to such a point that any change was merely to avoid taxes. Using this
same analysis, courts and the Service are likely to impute a dividend
to the buyer when he restructures a deal, having the seller redeem
some stock and lowering the price, to avoid a dividend to himself.
The buyer may also try to purchase a stock by paying a portion
of or the entire purchase price with a debt instrument. If the buyer
repays his debt by having the corporation make the payments, the
buyer is receiving a constructive dividend and will be taxed as such.
Revenue Ruling 58-614 stated, "[I]f the stock is in reality purchased
by a shareholder and paid for by the corporation, then, regardless of
the form of the transaction, the payment will be considered a dividend
to the shareholder who made the purchase."1 0 Similarly, if an indi-
vidual shareholder has a binding commitment to purchase stock from
another individual and he causes the corporation to buy a portion of
it, a dividend will result.' In this situation, however, there is always
the issue of whether the buyer had a binding obligation. If he did
not, the corporation's payments will not be treated as a constructive
dividend to him.
Both Carey 2 and Casner5 3 illustrated that a redemption or
dividend distribution in an integrated plan to transfer stock ownership
will not be treated as a dividend to the selling shareholder.' 54 The
distributions are considered part of the stock purchase price paid by
the buyer. 5  On the other hand, treating the distribution as part of
the purchase price does benefit the buyer. Indeed, Casner found
distributions to the selling shareholders to be properly taxable as
constructive dividends to the buying shareholders.' 56 Although the
court did not expressly attach signficance to the buyers' involvement
149. Id. at 334.
150. Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 920. See also McGinty v. Commis-
sioner, 325 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1963); Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960).
151. See generally Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958); Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); Stephens v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
1004 (1973); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 43.
152. United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
153. Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
154. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text supra.
155. See Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 1971).
156. Id. at 399.
in formulating the mode of purchase, implicitly this involvement was
determinative. Logically, if a buyer makes an offer to a corporation's
shareholders and they accept it only after distributing some of its
assets to themselves (or the sellers make an acceptable counteroffer),
how can the buyer be deemed to receive a constructive dividend? The
lesson to be learned from Casner is that the buyer should disassociate
himself from the corporate distribution. Mere knowledge that the
corporation is not discharging his obligation may not be enough to
preclude the finding of a constructive dividend.
When a buyer cannot afford the entire stock of a corporation,
the solution is to reduce the corporation's value through a distribution
of assets. This is the essence of each of the following transactions:
(1) The seller has some of his stock redeemed and sells the remain-
der to the buyer; (2) the seller sells a portion of his stock to the buyer
and has the remaining stock redeemed; (3) the buyer pays for all the
stock with a debt instrument and has the corporation make the
payments; and (4) the buyer agrees to buy all the stock, but at
closing pays for only a portion, causing the corporation to redeem the
remaining stock. As illustrated above, however, these similar trans-
actions result in different tax consequences: the first two will not be
deemed constructive dividends to the buyer, while the last two will.
Logically, the same tax treatment should be given to substantial-
ly similar transactions. A corporation's accumulated earnings and
profits are withdrawn at favorable capital gains rates by a terminating
shareholder. A purchasing shareholder should receive the same tax
benefits. A possible solution would allow corporate distributions, in
redemption of stock or otherwise, made for the sole purpose of
effecting a change in stock ownership to receive capital gain treat-
ment. In the case of a redemption, the shareholder would be taxed at
the favorable rates in the year of distribution. Other distributions
would decrease the basis of the shareholder's stock, resulting in
capital gain treatment when the stock is eventually sold. The requis-
ite purpose would be easily determinable in this solution. Further-
more, attribution of stock ownership and a -requirement of complete
termination of interest could be used to prevent tax avoidance.
V. Redemptions To Pay Death Taxes
A. In General
If a corporation redeems stock that comprises a substantial
portion of a decedent's estate, to the extent the distribution does not
exceed estate, inheritance, legacy and succession taxes, and funeral
and administration expenses, it will be treated as payment in ex-
change for the stock redeemed.157  The primary purpose of section




303 is to give liquidity to estates whose value is swollen by stock of
closely held corporations. Also, by excepting such redemptions from
the family attribution rules, it discourages dissolution of family-
owned corporations by stock sales to outsiders. The drafters of the
provision elaborated,
It has been brought to the attention of your committee that the
problem of financing the estate tax is acute in the case of estates
consisting largely of shares in a family corporation. The market
for such shares is usually very limited, and it is frequently diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to dispose of a minority interest. -If,
therefore, the estate tax cannot be financed through the sale of
the other assets in the estate, the executors will be forced to
dispose of the family business. In many cases the result will
be the absorption of a family enterprise by larger competitors,
thus tending to accentuate the degree of concentration of indus-
try in this country ....
Your committee is of the opinion that remedial action is
desirable in order to prevent the enforced sale of the family busi-
nesses which are so vital and desirable an element in our system
of free private enterprise.' 58
Although the stated purpose of the provision is to provide estates
with liquidity to pay death taxes, it will apply even though an estate is
already liquid1"9 and even though the redemption proceeds are not
used to pay taxes or expenses.' 60
B. Statutory Scheme
1. Relationship of Stock to Decedent's Estate.-For section
303 to apply, the value of the stock held by the estate must equal
thirty-five percent of the gross estate or fifty percent of the taxable
estate.' In meeting the percentage requirements, all stock included
in the decedent's gross estate may be counted. Thus, stock trans-
ferred by the decdent in contemplation of death or over which he had
a general power of appointment is counted.' 6 2  On the other hand,
because constructive ownership rules of section 318 are not applicable
to section 303, stock constructively owned by the decedent for other
purposes may not be counted in determining the percentage require-
ments.'6 5
158. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2
CuM. BULL. 380, 427-28.
159. United States v. Lake, 406 F.2d 941, 948 (5th Cir. 1969).
160. Id. at 948. See also Rev. Rul. 56-449, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 180.
161. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303 (b)(2) (A).
162. Rev. Rul. 69-616, 1969.2 CuM. BULL.45.
163. Byrd v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1967).
If stock of two or more corporations is included in a decedent's
gross estate, the aggregate amount of stock will be considered the
stock of one corporation for purposes of the thirty-five and fifty
percent requirements, providing the estate holds more than seventy-
five percent of the value of the outstanding stock of each corpora-
tion."" This relieves an estate that has a substantial interest in more
than one corporation, no one of which meets the percentage require-
ments and prevents an estate with interests in two or more corpora-
tions from meeting the thirty-five or fifty percent requirements
through post-mortem manipulation. Suppose a decedent owned forty
percent of corporation X and forty-five percent of corporation Y,
neither corporation satisfying the percentage requirements. Assume
further that Y agrees to exchange its own stock for X stock held by
the estate, that after the exchange the Y stock equals more than
thirty-five percent of the gross estate, and that the alternate valua-
tion date is elected and follows the exchange. This subterfuge will be
unavailing because the estate will be deemed to hold two blocks of Y
stock for purposes of section 303(b)(2).1
6 5
The decedent's personal representative has a limited ability to
aid the estate in meeting the percentage requirements of section 303.
First, the requirements speak in terms of "value." Therefore, it may
be wise to value the stock at its highest arguable value. Second,
because an alternate valuation date six months after death can be
elected, the personal representative may seek to encourage the corpo-
ration to take steps to increase its stock's value. For example, the
corporation could forego the payment of dividends to increase its
book value. Last, the personal representative has authority to deduct
administration and funeral expenses of the estate tax return or on the
estate's income tax return. If he deducts these expenses on the estate
tax return, the taxable estate will be lowered, thus making it easier to
reach the fifty percent requirements.1 66
2. Time Limitation for Redemption.-Section 303 states alter-
native tests to determine when a redemption must occur to receive
favorable tax treatment. The basic rule is that the redemption has to
occur within the period of limitations provided in section 6501(a)
(three years) for the assessment of federal estate taxes or within
ninety days thereafter. 16 T In practice, this limitation can be eliminat-
ed by distributing a long-term note in redemption of the stock.168 In
164. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303 (b)(2)(B).
165. Rev. Rut. 69-594, 1969-2 CuM. BuLL. 44.
166. See generally Kadish, Section 303-Redemptions To Pay Death Taxes and
Administrative Expenses, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 895 (1967); Tiger, How To Plan Stock
Redemptions To Pay Estate Taxes--The Problem of Section 303, 24 J. TAx. 92
(1966).
167. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b)(1)(A).
168. Rev. Ru. 67-427, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 156.
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addition, because the three-year period for assessment of taxes does
not run until the return is filed, a late filing will extend the period of
time in which a section 303 redemption can be made. 169  Further-
more, a filing within the statutory period is deemed to have been
made on the last day of the period. Thus, a redemption more than
three years and ninety days after the actual filing of the estate tax
return, but less than three years and ninety days from the last day of
the filing period will qualify for section 303 treatment. 170
The second time limit for a section 303 redemption is narrow in
scope. If a petition for redetermination of an estate tax deficiency
has been timely filed with the Tax Court, the redemption must be
made within sixty days after the court's decision becomes final.1
7 '
3. Persons Who May Use Section 303.-The language of sec-
tion 303 does not limit the persons entitled to its favorable treatment.
There is no requirement that distributions received be used to pay
estate taxes and expenses. It is only necessary that the stock re-
deemed under this section be included in the decedent's gross estate.
The treasury regulations provide, however, that
section 303 is not applicable to the case where stock is redeemed
from a stockholder who has acquired the stock by gift or pur-
chase from any person to whom such stock has passed from the
decedent. Nor is section 303 applicable to the case where stock
is redeemed from a stockholder who has acquired the stock from
the executor in satisfaction of a specific monetary bequest. 172
United States v. Lake' 73 involved a shareholder who purchased
stock from a beneficiary of the decedent and allegedly paid the death
taxes. The court held the regulations inapplicable to this taxpay-
er."'74 On the other hand, the Service has ruled that when a personal
representative has no discretionary power to distribute assets in kind,
a distribution of stock will be considered in satisfaction of a specific
monetary bequest and the distributee will be unable to make a section
303 redemption.' 75
4. Stock with Substituted Basis.-Section 303 (c) provides
that if a shareholder owns stock whose basis is determined by refer-
169. Rev. Rul. 72-204, 1972-1 CuM. BuLL. 422.
170. Rev. Rul. 69-47, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 94.
171. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b)(1)(B).
172. Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(f), T.D. 6152, as amended, T.D. 6724, 1964-1 CuM.
BULL. 128.
173. 406 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1969).
174. Id. at 950.
175. Rev. Rul. 70-297, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 66.
ence to stock that would meet the requirements of section 303(a),
this stock will qualify for the benefits of section 303.170
VI. Redemptions Through Related Corporations
A. Background
Section 302 states that "[i]f a corporation redeems its stock"
1 77
certain tax consequences will result. The section has no application,
therefore, to a shareholder who sells stock of one corporation to an-
other corporation. In Wanamaker v. Commissioner,7 s John Wana-
maker established a trust and transferred to it stock in a corporation
named John Wanamaker, Philadelphia. Later, lacking liquidity the
trustees transferred the stock to John Wanamaker, New York, a
wholly owned subsidiary corporation of John Wanamaker, Philadel-
phia. The trustees and the court treated the transaction as an ex-
change of a capital asset because it was not a redemption by John
Wanamaker, New York of its stock.
Recognizing that sales of stock of a parent corporation to its
subsidiaries by controlling shareholders could circumvent the provi-
sions relating to redemptions, Congress enacted section 115(g)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in 1950. Under section
115(g)(2) a transaction cast in the form of the Wanamaker transac-
tion was treated as though the subsidiary had first distributed assets to
the parent corporation and the parent had then redeemed its own
stock. 179 This section, however, did not completely close the loop-
hole. A shareholder who owned stock of two corporations could still
sell stock of one to the other. 180  The effect of this transaction was
the same as if the acquiring corporation distributed assets to the
shareholder and the shareholder made a capital contribution of the
stock. With the enactment of the 1954 Code, section 304 closed this
loophole.' l
B. Statutory Framework
1. Brother-Sister Corporations.-If one or more persons con-
trol two corporations and in exchange for property one of the corpo-
rations acquires stock in the other, the following consequences will
176. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(c).
177. Id. § 302(a) (emphasis added).
178. 11 T.C. 365 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 178 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1949)
(interpreting § 115(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
179. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 209(a), 64 Stat. 932.
180. Commissioner v. Pope, 239 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1957); Trianon Hotel Co. v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1958); Rev. Rul. 55-15, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 361,
revoked by Rev. Rul. 59-97, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 684.
181. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 304(a); see United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d




result: (1) The property distributed will be treated as a distribution
in redemption of the stock of the acquiring corporation; (2) the stock
acquired will be treated as a contribution to the capital of the corpo-
ration; (3) the determination of whether the redemption will be
treated as an exchange or as a dividend pursuant to section 302 will
be made with reference to the stock of the issuing corporation; and
(4) if the redemption is afforded dividend treatment, the amount of
the dividend will be based on the earnings and profits of the acquiring
corporation. 82
2. Parent-Subsidiary Corporations.-If one corporation con-
trols another and the subsidiary purchases stock from a shareholder
of the parent, the property distributed will be treated as a redemption
by the issuing corporation. In addition, the determination of divi-
dend treatment under section 302 will be made with reference to the
stock of the issuing corporation. Finally, if the redemption is treat-
ed as a dividend, the determination of its amount will be made as if
the property had been distributed by the acquiring corporation to the
issuing corporation and immediately thereafter distributed to the
shareholder by the issuing corporation.
1 83
3. Control.--Section 304 is dependent on control. For exam-
ple, in the brother-sister transaction the section requires the share-
holder to be in control of the two corporations. In this context
control means ownership of stock possessing at least fifty percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or at least fifty percent of the total value of all shares.' 84 In addition,
for purposes of determining control the constructive ownership rules
of section 318 are applicable. Furthermore, the fifty percent require-
ment for attribution to and from corporations is waived for purposes
of section 304.185
As a result of the attribution of ownership rules, it has been
suggested that the distinction between brother-sister corporations and
parent-subsidiary corporations has vanished.'8 6 When a person con-
trols two corporations, his stock in each is attributed to the other so
that each corporation is a parent of the other. Depending on the
182. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 304.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 304(c)(1).
185. Id. § 304(c)(2). See also Coyle v. United States, 415 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.
1968); Rev. Rul. 71-563, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 175.
186. B. BnTIKER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.39 (1971); Morans, Section 304, 22 TAX L. REV. 161 (1967).
Service's selection of the brother-sister or parent-subsidiary rules, dif-
ferent substantive effects on the amount of dividend and the basis of
the transferred stock can result. Others have suggested, however, that
the constructive ownership rules do not have this effect. Section
304(b)(2)(B) states that "the determination of the amount which is
a dividend shall be made as if the property were distributed by the
acquiring corporation to the issuing corporation and immediately
thereafter distributed by the issuing corporation. ' 187 The argument is
that the hypothetical distribution by the acquiring corporation to the
issuer can occur "only if the latter [is] an actual parent." ' 8
4. Scope of Section 304.-Even though section 304 was enact-
ed to prevent tax avoidance, it nevertheless applies in the absence
of this motive.18 9  Moreover, the acquiring corporation's receipt of
property equal in value to the property it distributed is of no conse-
quence. In United States v. Collins' the district court held that
because there was no reduction of the accumulated earnings and
profits of the acquiring corporation and the selling shareholder gave
up property of equal value to the amount distributed, section 304
would not apply. The circuit court' 9 ' reversed, explaining that the
consolidated assets of the two corporations were reduced and the
shareholder retained the same proportionate interest in the two corpo-
rations.'92
C. Relationship to Other Code Sections
1. Section 351.-Basically, section 351 provides that if prop-
erty is transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or
securities and immediately after the exchange the transferor is in
control of the corporation, no gain or loss will be recognized. If the
shareholder receives property or money, however, gain will be recog-
nized to the extent of its value.'19  Control for purposes of section
351 exists when the shareholder owns eighty percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least eighty percent of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock.194 Thus, if a shareholder owns all the stock of two corpora-
tions and exchanges the stock of one for property of the other, the
187. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 304(b) (2) (B).
188. B. BrrERE & J. EusicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.39 (1971).
189. Radnitz v. United States, 294 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1961).
190. 193 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1961).
191. Collins v. United States, 300 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.), rev'g 193 F. Supp.
602 (D. Mass. 1961).
192. Id. at 824.
193. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
194. Id. § 368(c).
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transaction falls within the purview of both sections 304 and 351.
The IRS treats section 304 as controlling.'
Section 304 of the Code is specifically directed at distribu-
tions in redemptions of stock through use of related corporations
meeting the 50% stock control requirement of section 304(c)
of the Code. Section 351 of the Code, on the other hand, gen-
erally applies to the formation of corporations in transactions
where assets are transferred by a person or persons who, after
the transfer, meet the 80% stock control requirement.
If section 351 of the Code were construed to apply to trans-
actions described in section 304 of the Code, an individual own-
ing between 80% and 100% of the acquiring corporation
would fall under the mantle of section 351 of the Code, whereas
an individual owning as much as 50% but less than 80% of
the acquiring corporation's stock would come within the scope
of section 304 of the Code, thereby raising the possibility of divi-
dend treatment. Such an interpretation of section 351 of the
Code would permit an 80% to 100% shareholder who has the
greater ability to shape the affairs of the corporation to his own
ends, to be free of the effects of section 304 of the Code, but
would subject the person with a lesser interest and, therefore,
a lesser ability to control the policies of the corporation, to the
more stringent requirement of section 304 of the Code.' 96
The Service's view, however, does not enjoy unanimous support.
The Sixth Circuit has held that section 351 is controlling, 197 basing its
decision on the words "except as otherwise provided in this chapter"
that appear in section 301." s Holding that sections 301 and 304 are
in pari materia, the court found section 351 to be an exception to
both sections. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit disagreed. 9 9 That court declared that by holding section 304
controlling it was effectuating the legislative intent and policy of the
two sections.200 Congress could easily rectify this ambiguity through
legislation.
195. Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 CuM. BuLL. 171.
196. Id. at 172.
197. Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).
198. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(a).
199. Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1973).
200. The court in Coates illustrated why it felt it was effectuating the intent of
Congress:
Our case reveals the ultimate inconsistency that would result if we followed
Stickney and held that the 'except as otherwise provided' provisos of §§ 302
(d) and 301(a) precluded § 304 applicability to these taxpayers. Other
parties to this transaction were taxed at the capital gains rate by virtue of
§§ 304(a) and 302(b)(2). . . . That result would not be altered were
we to follow Stickney's interpretation of the provisos. Thus Stickney's ra-
tionale would lead us to hold that those specifically excluded by Congress
from dividend treatment (by virtue of § 302(b) (2)) would be taxed at the
capital gains rate, while those Congress intended to be taxed at ordinary in-
2. Sections 317 and 306.--Section 304 is expressly applicable
only to exchanges of property of one corporation for stock of a related
corporation. Section 317(a), on the other hand, defines "property"
as excluding stock in the corporation making the distribution. There-
fore, if the sole owner of two corporations gives stock of one corpora-
tion to the other in exchange for a distribution of stock of that
corporation, section 304 is inapplicable. Furthermore, this transac-
tion is a taxable event in the nature of an exchange of a capital assets.
Thus, the stock received by the shareholder will not constitute section
306 stock and its subsequent sale or redemption will be free from the
adverse effects of that section.20
VII. A Final Note
One matter applicable to all three Code sections discussed in this
article is basis. When stock is sold, the gain or loss on the transaction
normally will be determined by the difference between the amount
received and the basis of the stock given up. If a shareholder
redeems stock and receives dividend treatment, however, a question
arises about the effect of the basis of the redeemed stock. 0 2  The
Code provides no answer to this question and the treasury regulations
say only that "[iln any case in which an amount received in redemp-
tion of stock is treated as a distribution of a dividend, proper adjust-
ment of the basis of the remaining stock will be made with respect to
the stock redeemed."2 °3 The Service offered this illustration:
A, an individual, purchases all of the stock of Corporation X
for $100,000. In 1955 the corporation redeems half of the
stock for $150,000, and it is determined that this amount consti-
tutes a dividend. The remaining stock of Corporation X held
by A has a basis of 100,000 dollars.2
0 4
Apparently, the proper adjustment is to allow the shareholder to
retain his original basis.
Although the general rules of taxation of stock redemptions are
easily stated, in practice they become strained by the pressures of the
multifarious situations they govern. As a result, applications of the
rules are often inconsistent or imprecise. Those rules that are incon-
sistent include waiver of family attribution 20 5 and corporate buy-sell
arrangements. 26  Those that are imprecise include the standard for
come rates (by virtue of §§ 304(a), 302(d) and 301(a)) would escape tax-
ation altogether ....
Id. at 473 n.9.
201. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 306.
202. Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949); Katcher, The Case
of the Forgotten Basis, 48 MicH. L. REV. 465 (1950).
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (1955).
204. Id.
205. See notes 126-29 and accompanying text supra.




determining dividend equivalency, °1 the application of stock owner-
ship attribution rules to redemptions through related corporations,208
and the relationship between sections 351 and 304 of the Code.2"9
Nevertheless, these imprecisions and inconsistencies are traps only for
the unwary. Careful planning and communication with the Service
will allow the tax counselor to advise his clients properly.
207. See notes 52-84 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 180-88 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 193-200 and accompanying text supra.
